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Nation Above the Law 
 
On 25 November 2017, in the city of Katowice, in front of the former Sejm (Regional 
Parliament) of interwar Poland’s autonomous region of Silesia (Silesian Voivodeship), the 
far-right nationalist organization ONR (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, National Radical 
Camp) staged a political happening. The ONR is a latter-day reincarnation of the 
eponymous interwar organization, which due to its radicalism was banned in 1934 in the 
then openly authoritarian Poland. The current ONR’s displeasure was brought about by 
the six Polish MEPs (members of the European Parliament). On 17 November 2017, they 
voted in favor of the European Parliament’s resolution that urges the Polish Parliament 
and government (both led by the Law and Justice party, PiS, Prawo i Sparwiedliwość) to 
observe and protect the rule of law in Poland.1  
 
Much of the pro-PiS and other nationalist mass media in Poland vilified the 
aforementioned MEPs as ‘traitors [of the Polish nation].’ ONR members in Katowice went 
one step further. They ritually hanged the portraits of ‘traitors’ Michał Boni, Danuta 
Huebner, Danuta Jazłowiecka, Barbara Kudrycka, Julia Pitera and Róża Thun; and 
subsequently threw them to the ground and trampled. Police stood by idly. Later the 
office of prosecutor public refused to investigate this clear-cut incident of hate speech, 
citing the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and of expressing political 
opinions.2 This tradition of ‘execution in effigie’ dates back to late Poland-Lithuania, 
when the country was being erased from the political map of Europe by the Habsburgs, 
Prussia and Russia in 1794-1795.3 No Polish citizen with a whiff of elementary school 
education has any doubts that the ONR members in Katowice intended to effect 
character assassination and public humiliation of the aforementioned MEPs.  
 
The concerned MEPs appealed to public at large for defense and support in the name of 
European values, democracy and rule of law. This appeal fell flat on the ears of PiS and 
ONR sympathizers. When PiS began dismantling the rule of law in Poland in late 2015, a 
prominent PiS MP and anticommunist oppositionist, Kornel Morawiecki, opined, on 25 
November 2015, that ‘the interest of the nation is above the law.’4 In a nutshell, this is 
how PiS understands, or rather misinterprets, the democratic principle of rule of law. 
The party’s electorate and ‘real patriots’ (that is, ethnonationalists) agree. 
Unsurprisingly, it is Kornel Morawiecki’s son, the former investment banker, Mateusz 
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Morawiecki, who now forces through the actual implementation of this nation-über-alles 
principle as the incumbent Polish Prime Minister. 
 
The Opole Beginnings 
 
One of the MEPs whose portraits were hanged is Danuta Jazłowiecka. In 1999-2003 she 
headed the Department of European Integration in the Regional Authority (Urząd 
Marszałkowski) of Opole Region (Województwa Opolskie). I cooperated with her, sharing 
my experience in this field. In 1994 I graduated from Central European University 
(Prague) with an MA in European Integration. Between 1996 and 1999, I acted as the 
Opole Regional Governor’s (Wojewoda) Plenipotentiary on European Integration 
(Pełnomocnik Wojewody do Spraw Integracji Europejskiej). Subsequently, from 1999-
2002 I was the Opole Regional President’s (Marszałek) Advisor on Foreign Cooperation 
(Doradca do Spraw Współpracy z Zagranicą). 
 
After 2002, due to the growing politicization of civil service in Poland, I decided to focus 
solely on research, having worked at Opole University since 1995. As a contribution to 
my civil service colleagues’ efforts for Poland’s accession to the European Union, I 
compiled the Polsko-angielsko-niemiecki Glosariusz regionalny Województwa Opolskiego 
(The Polish-English-German Glossary of the Regional Terminology of the Province of 
Opole). With a subsidy from the Opole Regional Authority,5 this glossary was published 
in May 2004 for the long-awaited occasion of the accession of Poland into the European 
Union. Among others, Danuta Jazłowiecka reviewed and recommended this glossary for 
publication. 
 
This glossary is appended with a statistical-historical addendum. Apart from giving the 
Polish and Soviet view according to which the new German-Polish border was recognized 
in 1945 at the Potsdam Conference, this addendum also presents the official view on this 
matter as adopted by West Germany and the Western Allies, namely, Britain, France and 
the United States. All the four Western states withheld the final de jure recognition of 
this frontier in light of international law until when the German-Polish Border Treaty of 
1990 was ratified in 1992.6 
 
The latter view was vehemently denied and labelled as ‘revanchist’ in communist Poland. 
On cue of this well-remembered piece of communist propaganda, the radical nationalist 
and anti-German MP, Jerzy Czerwiński, convened a press conference on 8 May 2004. It 
was an immediate media opportunity prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections. During 
this conference Czerwiński lambasted me as an ‘anti-Polish revanchist’ for including in 
the glossary this Western view on Poland’s western border, as held between 1945 and 
1992. However, the matter was a mere tool of political expediency. Czerwiński wielded it 
deftly, first of all, to further his political career in order to make himself better known as 
a ‘true patriot’ in the nationalist circles. The other purpose was to criticize his political 
opponents – that is, the pro-democratic PO (Platforma Obywatelska, Civic Platform) and 
the German minority, as represented by the TSKN (Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne 
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6 Tomasz Kamusella. 2004. Polsko-angielsko-niemiecki Glosariusza Województwa Opolskiego. Opole: Oficyna Piastowska, p. 117. 
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Niemców na Śląsku Opolskim, Socio-Cultural Society of the Germans of Opole Silesia). 
At that time the PO government ruled Poland, while the PO-TSKN coalition ruled Opole 
Region. 
 
Immediately after Czerwiński’s conference, the TSKN leader and Opole Deputy Regional 
President, Ryszard Galla, publically called for burning the entire run of the glossary.7 
Subsequently, Opole University issued a public declaration in which I was condemned as 
a scholar and a person.8 Not to be outdone, the Regional Authority, led by Galla, issued 
a similar declaration condemning me as a former civil servant and person. In addition, 
they referred my case to the prosecutor public, proposing that I breached a non-existent 
law on the ‘Polish raison d'état’ (polska racja stranu).9 In this context, President (Rektor) 
of Opole University expressed his regrets that he had no legal instruments to fire me or 
punish otherwise.10 What is more, the Regional Authority requested the Polish National 
Library in Warsaw (Biblioteka Narodowa) to withhold readers’ access to the two copies of 
this glossary in this library’s holdings.11 Belatedly, the Silesian Institute (Instytut Śląski) 
joined the chorus.12 Since 1957, this institute has been responsible for providing 
expertise that would facilitate the Polonization of Opole Region, which used to be part of 
Germany prior to 1945. 
 
All these steps were taken behind my back, when I was on a research fellowship in the 
Library of Congress, Washington. Neither did the university and the Regional Authority, 
nor journalists seek to hear my opinion on the matter. The character assassination was 
conducted swiftly and with the unwavering support of all the political parties in Opole 
Region. Not a single leader or member of these parties did stand up in my defense, or at 
least in the defense of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and research. 
Danuta Jazłowiecka, a prominent PO party official, kept silence, too. This paid off, in 
2005 she became an MP, and between 2009 and 2019 served as an MEP. Now, after the 
2019 parliamentary elections, she brushes sides with Jerzy Czerwiński as senators in the 
Polish Senate. Galla’s principled stance also gave him a political boost, and since 2005 
he has served as a sole German minority MP in the Polish Parliament. 
 
Between Civic and Ethnic Polish Nationalism 
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In line with the Polish Constitution, the Polish law and the rule of law, the Opole Office of 
Prosecutor Public rejected Galla’s and the Opole Regional Authority’s accusation that 
through my research I breached a hypothetical law on the ‘Polish raison d'état.’13 But it 
took eight years longer – until 2012 – for the Polish National Library to notice that 
censoring books in democratic Poland was highly inappropriate. At this Regional 
Authority’s explicit request,14 the Library removed the caveat on not making the 
glossary available to interested readers.15 Obviously, not a single person who 
commenced or joined this character assassination campaign (briefly, nagonka in Polish), 
did care to explain, let alone apologize, to me. This amply proves that Morawiecki Sr’s 
pronouncement on the interest of the nation being above the law (including the 
Constitution) was as much valid in 2004 as it is nowadays. 
 
This principle has invariably governed Polish politics since 1956, when stalinism (aka 
‘internationalism’ or ‘internationalist communism’) was replaced with national 
communism. On this basis, in 1968, it was ‘necessary’ to ethnically cleanse communist 
Poland of whomever the national communist government considered to be a Jew.16 It 
was then when the authorities perfected the techniques of public shaming, and 
mobilizing colleagues and the mass media against a targeted person.17 Since that time, 
these methods of individual or collective character assassination have been deeply 
internalized – consciously or not – by the elite and public at large in Poland. It took no 
time to deploy them, as a knee-jerk reflex, against me as a person and scholar in 2004. 
 
This ‘defensive-cum-offensive’ mechanism is nearly automatically deployed for 
protecting the ‘Polish raison d'état.’ The latter is invoked in a ritualistic, bonding and 
group-forming manner, without any attempt at defining this concept. When I ran an 
experiment asking scholars from Opole University and civil servants from the Regional 
Authority about what ‘raison d'état’ (racja stanu) might mean, they invariably were 
taken aback. Those who attempted to define this concept ad hoc, confused it with 
‘estate’ (stan), or the politically-defined stratum of population in a feudal polity, for 
instance, the estate of nobility or the estate of burghers (stan szlachecki, stan 
mieszczański). 
 
After the fall of communism in 1989, the democratization of Poland removed 
‘communism’ from the postcommunist country’s leading ideology of national 
communism, leaving nationalism alone in this elevated role. One of the main political 
quarrels about the postcommunist Constitution of 1997 was about the definition of the 
Polish nation. Finally, the camp advocating broad church-style inclusiveness won. This 
Constitution’s Preamble defines the Polish nation as ‘all citizens of the Republic,’ 
irrespective of confession, economic status, ethnicity, gender or language (Articles 32, 
                                                          







16 https://www.newsweek.pl/polska/spoleczenstwo/wystawa-obcy-w-domu-w-polin-polska-ich-odrzucila-wywiad/gxscsr0  
17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Polish_political_crisis#Anti-Jewish_mobilization_and_purges,_party_politics  
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33, 35, 53).18 From the official perspective, today’s Poland, unlike the United States or 
Chile, is a civic nation-state. 
 
But in reality, the vast majority of politicians and the population defines the Polish nation 
in the traditional ethnolinguistic terms, as explicitly championed during the interwar 
period and now by the ONR, and otherwise by the post-1956 national communist regime 
of the Polish People’s Republic. In this view the Polish nation is composed of 
straightforwardly heterosexual Polish-speaking Catholics. Protestants and culturally 
Catholic atheists are half-heatedly welcomed, too. However, Polish-speakers of the 
Jewish religion or origin are excluded, alongside non-Polish-speakers, those who profess 
Orthodox Christianity or Greek Catholicism, and LGTB minorities. 
 
As a result, a considerable group of Polish citizens, who in light of the Constitution are 
full-fledged members of the Polish nation, de facto are excluded from this national 
commonality. On the other hand, the latter approach allows for speaking about the 
Polish diaspora (Polonia), as encompassing citizens of other countries, who happen to be 
Catholic heritage Polish-speakers, or Catholics of this ethnolinguistic origin. Obviously, 
this definition does exclude such actual or heritage Polish-speakers of the Jewish religion 
or origin. According to the Polish authorities, in Israel there is no Polish diaspora, despite 
400,000 people of such a background living in this country. The anti-Semitism of 1968 
continues in Poland to this day in the hardly-concealed de facto ethnic (linguistic and 
confessional) definition of the Polish nation and its diaspora.19 
 
Since its electoral victory in 2015, the PiS ruling party has attempted to destroy the rule 
of law in Poland and change the country’s Constitution. One of the main goals of this 
policy is to bring the Constitution’s civic definition of the Polish nation in line with the de 
facto ethnic (‘patriotic, true’) definition of this nation. The current tension between the 
Constitution’s civic nationalism and the widely espoused de facto ethnic nationalism is to 
be ameliorated by replacing the former with the latter. 
 
Opole Revisited: A European or Ethno-Polish Future? 
 
The majority of the country’s population supports PiS’s attempts to this end. Critics of 
this trend, grouped in the PO-led pro-democratic opposition, cry foul. In their short-
sightedness it is the entailed endangering of the rule of law that irks them most. They 
fail to see, that the PiS-led and enabled Polish ethnic nationalists aspire to replace the 
Constitution’s inclusive civic definition of the Polish nation with the exclusivist ethnic 
one. Senator Danuta Jazłowiecka and the German minority leader, MP Ryszard Galla, 
valiantly oppose PiS’s program of hardening authoritarianism that liquidates the 
tripartite division of power, and subjects the judiciary and the legislative to the 
executive. In turn, the latter is informally but de facto fully controlled by the PiS party’s 
president (prezes). What is more, without any mandate to this end, the as yet 
undeclared dictator gives orders to the incumbent Polish President and Prime Minister. 
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The opposition fears – and rightly so – of the gradual dismantling of democracy in 
Poland. But they are unable to see that the PiS party’s overarching project is to formally 
exclude from the Polish body politic (nation) those, who are already informally excluded 
from it and customarily denigrated. The opposition, including, Jazłowiecka and Galla, are 
accessories to this ‘great patriotic’ end (so much desired by the ONR), and they do not 
seem to realize their role in this plan. 
 
It was them, who enabled and encouraged Jerzy Czerwiński and other ONR-style 
political forces, when Jazłowiecka and Galla kept mum or actively joined the 2004 
nationalist campaign of character assassination against me as a scholar and person. 
Despite any program or ideological differences, all the mainstream parties in 
postcommunist Poland, including the German minority’s TSKN, have been right-wing and 
(at least culturally) Catholic in their character. All of them have been slavishly loyal to 
the Polish ethnolinguistic nationalism and preached the curious kind of conservatism that 
provides for large-scale welfare measures, typical of social democracy and socialism. But 
there is a logic to this paradox, the Polish conservatism ‘conserves’ none other, but the 
ethnonational-cum-Catholic-cum-socialist realities as worked out in national communist 
Poland after 1956. 
 
Many members of Poland’s German minority may take offense, when they hear I 
propose that the TSKN is a typical Polish ethnonationalist grouping. In defense of this 
thesis, I can cite the afore-described Ryszard Galla’s full support for the 2004 
ethnonationalist campaign of character assassination aimed against my person. But it is 
an anecdotal piece of evidence. More significantly, during the almost three decades since 
Warsaw recognized the German minority in 1990, the TSKN has not managed to create 
a single German-medium school, let alone a minority educational system with German 
as the language of instruction. Financial and other aid flowing to the German minority 
from Germany and Warsaw was used for developing sewage, water, electrical, road and 
other infrastructure in the minority villages and towns across Opole Region. The rest of 
the monies have supported a good standard of living for the TSKN leadership. On the 
contrary, Lithuania’s Polish minority of a similar demographic size is much less 
subsidized by Poland or Vilnius. Yet, Lithuania’s Poles have at their disposal a full Polish-
language educational system of over 100 schools from kindergartens and elementary 
schools, to secondary and vocational school, including the Polish-language university in 
Vilnius. 
 
Neither the self-avowedly democratic PO when it was in power before 2015, nor PiS now 
do support the Silesians’ heart-felt desire that Silesian should be recognized as a 
language. It does not matter that the 2011 census registered almost 1 million people 
who declare that they are members of the ethnolinguistic Silesian nation. For half of 
them, Silesian is the primary language of their everyday communication. The Polish 
authorities choose to disregard the census’s results when it comes to the Silesians and 
their language. In this case there is no difference between the PO and PiS, which 
indicates that both parties are ethnonationalist in their basic character. 
 
The Polish ethnonationalist principle of the primacy of the nation over the law was rarely 
explicitly evoked before Kornel Morawiecki uttered it in full view of television cameras in 
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the Polish Parliament in 2015. However, having been thoroughly conditioned as such 
during the period of national communism, Poland’s elites and population at large have 
taken utmost care to respect this thin red line after 1989. Hence, it is not surprising that 
in 2004 none of my friends or colleagues either in Opole or elsewhere in Poland dared to 
stand in my defense, or at least in the defense of common sense, democracy, European 
values and the truth. They had too much to lose by the way of gainful employment, 
academic or political career. Or maybe, most did not see a point, having internalized the 
Polish ethnolinguistic nationalism as their preferred worldview. 
 
Whatever the root cause, the ongoing quarrel over the rule of law in Poland is of 
secondary importance. What truly is at stake is the civic inclusiveness or ethnic 
exclusion of the Polish body politic. Whoever calls themselves a liberal but espouses the 
latter, is a ‘liberal’ in name only. Should PiS’s program of making ethnolinguistic 
nationalism into the explicit ideological basis of the changed or new Constitution win, 
postcommunist Poland’s aspirations to the European values of equality, liberty, fraternity 
and solidarity will be over. The obtaining Constitution’s definition of the Polish nation as 
composed of all Polish citizens will become a distant dream. In order to remind the 
readers what a treasure may be lost, I allow myself to quote the Constitution’s 
aspirational declaration of such an inclusive civic nation and its values: 
 
We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic,  
Both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, 
good and beauty,  
As well as those not sharing such faith but drawing those 
universal values from other sources,  
Equal in rights and obligations towards the common good - 
Poland,  
Beholden to our ancestors for their labors, their struggle for 
independence achieved at great sacrifice, for our culture rooted 
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